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ABSTRACT  
Dutch policy makers recently set the public debate on ageing alight by enforcing drastic cuts in early 
retirement opportunities; increasing taxation of the aged and augmenting retirement age are also 
considered. 
The prime argument is to diminish a burden on public finances far in future. This paper argues that 
this argument ignores, first, that on a cohort basis ageing is a very limited problem and, therefore, 
also the financing of future occupational pensions based on capital funding. Second, data taken from 
the Income Panel Survey show that the financing of the basic pay-as-you-go state pension AOW 
over the coming decades is not a major problem that could not be solved by the future increase in 
employment participation which may plausibly be expected. 
Because of its strong focus on public finance Dutch policymaking also ignores important inequalities 
in the ageing process as well as important cost disadvantages of private pension funding in 
comparison with collective schemes – two aspects which, by contrast, are central to the UK pension 
debate. The first inequality concerns the risk of increased poverty among retired women that may 
result from the changes made in the occupational pension system and occur because of low lifetime 
earnings from the massive part-time employment; the phenomenon should be discussed and 
prevented. Second, the life expectancy of the low educated is significantly shorter than that of the 
better educated. In the case of a uniform pension age this induces the risk of a transfer of pension 
savings from the former to the latter, from the less to the better paid; this should be accounted for 
when discussing augmenting the pension age. 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
Today’s inhabitants of the Netherlands live an average of 79 years, which is over 30 years longer 
than a century ago. The share of people aged 65 and over in the population currently amounts to 
14%, compared to 6% then; according to forecasts this figure will be 24% by about 2040. In the light 
of these demographic projections, there has been much speculation in public debate and 
government policy about major economic repercussions. A smaller segment of the population will 
be productive and older people will receive a larger share of the income while at the same time 
generating much higher costs, especially related to health care. This has prompted a raft of far-
reaching policy measures and studies aimed at reviewing pension schemes, combating early 
retirement and privatising health care, to be followed probably by a raising of the official retirement 
age. 
In this paper I will question the seriousness of this demographic trend and its financial implications, 
with demographics and older people’s incomes central to my argument. I will omit issues like 
healthcare costs because I share the conviction that the increasing cost of care has more to do with 
the end of life itself than with the later age at which this occurs (compare e.g. Seshamani, 2004). 
Actually, if additional life expectancy is spent in reasonable health, the cost increase will be 
postponed with growing life expectancy. Central to my argument are people aged 65 and over, who 
form the hard core of the ageing population. Older employees, 50 to 64 years old, and their 
potential exit from the workforce before the age of 65, constitute a topic which would deserve 
separate treatment but in the Netherlands their employment behaviour has already changed much 
to the better over the last decade and more than in most other countries (see OECD, 2005, Figure 
2.4). I will look at first-order effects only – that is, the effects of the changing population structure 
that accompany population ageing, assuming that individual behaviour remains unchanged. I will 
demonstrate that these effects will be limited, thereby rendering any study of second-order effects, 
aimed at changes in that behaviour, unnecessary for the time being. De Vries (2006) as well as 
Verbon (2006) also do not view the future increase in public expenditure in relation to ageing as 
one of disastrous proportions and challenge the need to adopt draconian measures at this time. 
Large model-based studies, such as the report on population ageing from the Netherlands Bureau 
for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB) (Van Ewijk et al., 2006) are indispensable for identifying second-
order effects but the false impression that we are able to predict the future decades in advance. The 
report forecasts a budget deficit of 3 to 3.5% of GDP in 2040, which is 34 years from now. Note 
that it was the same CPB that was 3.5% out in its projections for the 2002 budget deficit, which 
forecast was made in April 2001 – only eight months in advance. 
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My findings point out that the official view of the government and its advisors and various political 
parties exaggerates the socio-economic problem and constrains the debate in such a way that 
important aspects of population ageing and the way it is funded are overlooked – at the risk of a 
kind of tunnel vision. My key argument is that the issue of the country’s ageing population in the 
decades ahead – demographically and therefore financially – is viewed insufficiently from a cohort 
perspective. Approached on this basis, we find that the future problem is of modest proportions. 
The cohort approach takes into account precautions that people take for their old age when they 
are still young – with its very impressive occupational pension savings, the Netherlands is virtually 
unique in this respect. In addition I argue that there are significant disparities in ageing between 
different social groups and that important transaction cost are associated with different types of 
financial provisions for old age. Both factors can have major socio-economic repercussions and can 
lead to unintended transfers but – quite mistakenly – do not feature in the Dutch debate on ageing. 
I will look first at demographic trends from a cohort perspective in Section 2 and then at funding for 
old age in Section 3, before focusing on inequalities in both in Section 4. The paper ends with 
conclusions and comments on policy. 
10   AIAS  -  UvA Population ageing in the Netherlands: Demographic and  Financial arguments for a balanced approach  
2   LIFE EXPECTANCY AND DEMOGRAPHIC PRESSURE:  COHORT 
VERSUS CALENDAR POPULATION 
Although we cannot deny that large demographic shifts are taking place, it is nevertheless possible to 
put them in perspective in order to better assess their economic impact. With regard to the extent 
of population ageing, it is significant that the increase in life expectancy is much smaller at a later age, 
especially at 65, than at birth. A cohort approach shows this clearly, leading us to conclude that the 
anticipated growth in the old-age dependency ratio is modest. 
The life expectancy of 79 years mentioned at the start needs to be qualified. It represents the 
average number of years that a newborn from 2006 can expect to live, not how long the country’s 
current 16 million inhabitants may expect to live on average. Life expectancy at birth has increased 
largely as a result of falling child mortality rates, with a growing number of people first reaching 
adulthood and then the age of 65. While the latter group does on average live somewhat longer 
than those of similar age did in the past, this increase is extremely small in comparison to the gains 
made at birth. People are older when they die, but not necessarily old. This distinction plays a 
surprisingly minor role in the Dutch debate on ageing. And absent altogether from the debate is the 
fact that the Netherlands is trailing behind internationally in terms of life expectancy. Whereas in 
1960 Dutch men and women still held first place among the 15 EU countries in terms of life 
expectancy, Dutch men have since fallen to fifth place and women to eleventh (Garssen, 2005, 
Figure 1). Eurostat expects to see the Netherlands below the average of EU including the new 
member states in 2050 (EPC, 2006, 28). 
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*) Later years as compared to the situation of 1861-65 
Source: estimated from Statistics Netherlands (CBS)/Statline Historical survival tables and current forecast 2004–2050. 
 
Figure 1 shows the growth in life expectancy at different ages from the start of statistics-keeping in 
the period 1861-65 until 2050, which is as far ahead as official projections currently extend. These 
are sample sections of the population per calendar year for four different ages (0, 20, 50 and 65) and 
hence different birth years. We see that the enormous gain of more than 40 years, which 
corresponds to the total height of the column at birth, 0 years, is already halved by the age of 20, 
and gradually drops further to 7 years (for men) or 9 (for women) at 65 years – that is only one fifth 
of the gain at birth. 
The tripartite division of the columns also shows trends over three subperiods: before the 
introduction of the public old-age pension (AOW) in the period 1956-1960, from then until the 
present (2004) and from now until 2050. Because the greatest gain at birth – 35 of the 40 years – 
was made during the first subperiod, it was already behind us when the pension was introduced. 
Later there are only 8 additional years (5.6 + 2.6 and 6.7 + 1.2 for men and women respectively) 
until 2050. In later periods the growth at older ages is relatively more significant, particularly for the 
oldest women, but it remains slight in terms of absolute number of years. Men aged 65 have gained 
only 2.1 years since the AOW was introduced. Conspicuously, the future growth for women – the 
upper part of the columns – works out lower than for men for all four ages. It should be noticed 
that a larger share of the figure than may at first appear is based on projections rather than actual 
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outcomes. At present, we can only be certain about the outcomes up until the last generation, born 
around 1920, which has almost died out. 
 
Table 1  Life expectancy (years) based on calendar and cohort according to sex and age 
   Calendar   Cohort  Total growth  


























Men                                
0  36  71  76  79  36  44  66  73  43  36  -6.6  -15 
20  60  74  77  80  62  68  74  77  20  15  -5.3  -26 
50  69  76  78  81  73  73  76  80  11  7.7  -3.8  -33 
65  76  79  81  83  78  79  81  83  7.1  5.2  -1.9  -27 
 
Women                                  
0  38  75  81  83  38  47  68  80  44  41  -3.1  -7 
20  61  77  81  83  63  69  77  81  22  18  -4.2  -19 
50  71  78  83  84  74  75  82  84  13  10  -3.2  -24 
65  76  81  84  86  78  81  84  86  9.3  7.4  -1.9  -21 
Source: see Figure 1. 
 
The calendar data relate to different birth cohorts. The 0-year-olds are born in 2046-50, 2001-05, 
1956-60 or 1861-65 respectively and the 65-year-olds in the years 1981-85, 1936-40, 1891-95 and 
even 1796-1800. The total gain of 7.1 years for 65-year-old men is based on a comparison between 
people born at the height of the French Revolution and those who are now aged about 25 and who 
will turn 65 in 2046-50. Table 1 shows the difference in life expectancy between this calendar 
population and the newborn cohorts who have reached the age of 65 since 1861. These cohorts 
relate to exactly the same historical period of 120 years. The gain of 5.2 years for men aged 65 
relates to those born in 1981-85 compared to 1861-65. 
 
Old-age dependency 
The old age dependency ratio (OADR) is defined here as the ratio of people aged 65 and over to 
those aged 20 to 64, who represent the potential labour force. The calendar-OADR is the 
relationship between these numbers for different people living at the same moment, whereas the 
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cohort-OADR is the relationship between the cumulative number of years that the same people all 
born in the same year live on average beyond the age of 65 compared to the previous 45-year 
period between the ages of 20 and 65. This cohort-OADR is estimated on the basis of the remaining 
life expectancy at 20 and at 65 years of age multiplied by the chances at birth of reaching that age. 
For the future, it is assumed that the chances of survival for 20-year-olds will remain constant and 
increase for 65-year-olds every five years by 0.5% for men and 0.25% for women respectively. The 
cohort-OADR best reflects increasing individual life expectancy (see also Turner, 2004, 127). 
Figure 2 shows the OADR value using both approaches. The calendar-OADR (the grey area) has 
risen gradually over a long period, almost doubling over the last century from 12 to 23%. For the 
years ahead, a dramatic acceleration is projected toward a peak of 44% by 2040. By contrast, the 
line in the figure gives the cohort-OADR according to birth year. Compared with the calendar-
based ratio (15%), it is already high at 27% for those born in 1951-55 (first available data) and who 
will begin to retire in 2015; the cohort-OADR value for birth year 1973 (people who will turn 65 in 
2038) is 29%, only a little higher. For those born today, this value is 34%. The remaining increase up 
to 39% extends to the cohort that will make its entry into the world in 2050 and that will not be 
turning 65 until 2115. Therefore, on a cohort basis, population ageing in the coming decades is very 
minor compared to the calendar approach. We shall now see how critical this difference is when it 
comes to funding the ageing population. 
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Figure 2  Old-age dependency ratio (65+ as % of 20-64-year-olds) on calendar and 
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Source: calculated from CBS, National Accounts and CPB, Macro-economic forecast (MEV) 1999 Table A.12 (dotted line). 
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3 COHORT EFFECTS ON OLD-AGE REVENUE AND FUNDING 
Figure 3 presents a tentative outline of developments in AOW expenditure since the pension was 
introduced in 1957 and of occupational pensions and private life insurances, based on CPB data since 
1969 and more definitively on CBS data since 1980. In 1957 AOW expenditures began at around 
2.5% of GDP and grew to 6.3% in the early eighties, followed by a period of stagnation and then a 
drop to 4.7% in 2004. The decline occurred because the AOW level, like many other social benefits 
and the minimum wage, lagged strongly behind other wages and incomes. Occupational pensions 
have shown a clearly rising trend which – after 1980 – has more or less compensated for the decline 
in the AOW, while private life insurances have risen from 1995 onwards. On balance, total pension 
payments have increased from around 7% in about 1970 to over 11% today: rises of 4.2% for 
occupational pensions and 2.6% for life insurances on top of the AOW. The calendar-OADR value 
went up from 19% to 23% over the same period. The income position of older people has improved 
but the implicit level – 11% financial share as against 23% demographic share – is less than half of the 
general average (if children are excluded from the calculation). 
The recent CPB study on population ageing anticipates that in 2040 the AOW will amount to 8.8% 
of GDP and occupational pensions to 8.7%; life insurances are not mentioned although they too are 
important for government finances (Van Ewijk et al., 2006, 85). This means that the share of old-age 
expenditures in GDP will almost double. However, the relative income position on the basis of the 
calendar-OADR will remain fairly constant – 18% as opposed to 43%. 
The above illustrates financial developments for the AOW and occupational pensions in the way 
they are usually shown as a percentage of GDP1, but we have to ask ourselves whether this in fact 
presents the right picture. Firstly, GDP is not the most adequate basis on which funding should be 
measured. AOW contributions are levied on individual income from work and enterprise, while 
occupational-pension contributions are levied on wages, both of which have declined in relation to 
GDP. Whereas the AOW contribution was still levied on 47% of GDP in 1980, this was only 22% in 
2004 following the Van Oort and Zalm/Vermeend tax reviews of 1990 and 2001 respectively – the 
contribution rate rose in inverse proportion. The wage share from which pension contributions are 
paid also declined in the same period, from 58 to 51%, but this matters less as wages are precisely 
what such contributions aim to cover. Secondly, GDP does not permit much detail, either in terms 
of age of the income receiver or type of income. Older people may have incomes other than just 
their pension. In addition, pensions do not go exclusively to people over the age of 65. Annuities can 
be enjoyed at any age provided that the relevant fiscal savings regulations are complied with. Nor 
are occupational pensions the exclusive preserve of people aged 65 and over thanks to early 
pensions, job-related early retirement or survivor’s pensions. 
                                                  
1Which is what I also did for the OECD (2005). 
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Figure 4  Share of people aged 65 and over in national occupational pension and 
annuity income and proportion of pension recipients <65 years in relation to 
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Source: 1977-1999 own calculations based on IPO data and 2001-2003 Statline (level adapted by 1999 ratios) and CPB, MEV2006 
Table A.7 and CBS population statistics. 
 
Direct income data from the Income panel survey (IPO) of Statistics Netherlands can address these 
problems. While the AOW goes exclusively to people aged 65 and over, occupational pensions and 
annuities do not. Figure 4 shows the share of the aged in the national total of pension and annuity 
receipts according to the IPO. The figure dropped to a low of 47% in 1990, only to climb back to its 
original level of 60% now. This picture is consistent with the fluctuation from 10.5 up to 16.5% and 
down again to 11.5% in the numbers in early retirement relative to the persons aged 65 and over 
which is also shown in Figure 42. Finally, the contribution of other forms of income for older people 
(from enterprise or work, interest, dividends and benefits such as rent subsidies, child allowances 
and social security) is not insignificant, despite having fallen considerably from 18 to 11% (not 
shown). 
The IPO data also offer direct insights into the financial OADR – that is, the ratio of total relevant 
incomes of those aged 65+ to the total relevant incomes of those aged 20-64. This can again be 
defined on a calendar and a cohort basis. Occupational pensions and life-insurance payments are 
made on the basis of savings out of older people’s previous personal contributions and therefore 
relate to the cohort-OADR. Figure 5 shows the financial calendar-OADR and the corresponding 
demographic OADR, both calendar-based. After a decrease, the former fluctuates at around 11%, 
                                                  
2 Total number of people with early or survivor’s pension taken as a percentage of the population aged 55 to 64 years. 
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while the latter rises slowly to 23%. The number of older income earners rises but because their 
average income lags behind at the same time, there is only a small change in the aggregate ratio. The 
outcome contradicts that older people would have become richer in relative terms. 
 


























































*)  AOW received by 65+ as % of total income of 20-64-year-olds; those who received the AOW abroad are 
not included, in contrast to Figure 3. 
Source: own calculations from CBS, income panel survey (Atkinson and Salverda, 2005, explain the nature of the data). 
 
The IPO data can also provide insight into the different income components. At approximately 55%, 
the contribution of the AOW to total 65+ income is significantly larger than the 40% calculated 
above on a GDP basis – in actual fact, the difference is even greater because income components 
other than pensions are included here in total income as well. The AOW contribution is no longer 
falling but remains almost unchanged. Although occupational pensions and annuities once again make 
up a growing share, their significance in quantitative terms is considerably less – one third, as against 
60% calculated on a GDP basis. Strikingly enough, occupational pensions and AOW together do not 
amount to 70% of previous earnings, something which is confirmed by data provided to the author 
by ABP and PGCM, the two largest pension funds in the Netherlands (and very large by 
international standards as well). In 2004, newly retired people had an average pension accrual of 25 
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to 27 years, with only 10 to 20% of them coming close to the 40 years needed for a full accrual of 
70%. Regrettably, we know of no systematic statistical data on pension accrual.3
So what does the future now hold for the incomes of those aged 65 and over and the funding 
required? When it comes to average individual incomes, we can only make assumptions – for 
example, that the present ratios will continue unchanged, which in effect means that incomes for 
those aged 65 and over, and particularly the AOW, will simply share in the fortunes of the 
economy. Thus increases in productivity are implicitly taken into account and can therefore not be 
considered separately as a source of future funding, as Jacobs (2006) correctly points out. Because 
of marked differences in funding for the two, I will discuss the public pension and occupational 
pensions separately. The AOW is generated by the calendar population on the basis of pay-as-you-
go, while occupational pensions are paid for by the cohort population on the basis of capital funding 
out of pension savings. Expectations are that social-security payments to people aged 65 and over 
will also increase as a consequence of the growing insufficiency of AOW coverage, especially for 
immigrants who have lived in the Netherlands for less than the required 50 years. As the total effect 
is negligible4 and people may receive the missing amount as social assistance instead, I will not take 
this into account. 
 
3.1  PUBLIC OLD-AGE PENSION (AOW) 
There has been considerable discussion about the future scale of the AOW, but it is commonly 
assumed that its share of GDP will rise sharply, give or take a percentage point or two. The CPB 
currently puts it at almost 9%, while the Social Insurance Bank (SVB) is forecasting 7% (Van Eekelen 
and Olieman, 2001). As already mentioned, GDP in itself does not fund the AOW – it is better to 
directly tie the funding requirement to the income of 20-64-year-olds. 
Forecasts have as much value as population projections or assumptions about income have. Table 2 
presents a rough estimate based on the IPO data, which combines today’s income levels with 
projected ratios for 2038, when the value of the demographic calendar-OADR will reach its peak. 
The increase in the number of joint AOW households has been taken into account. An interesting 
feature of population forecasts as we have seen is that men rather than women will account for 
much of the additional life expectancy. Perhaps unexpectedly, this means that more women than is 
currently the case will be sharing a household with a man – a trend that we have been observing for 
some time now (Kroniek, 2005). These women will then be entitled to only half the AOW for 
married people, and not to the 70% for single people. 
                                                  
3 It implies that international comparisons that put Dutch pensions at 70%, risk to be misleading. 
4 At the end of 2004 persons aged 65 had an average accrual of about 47 out of maximum 50 years (Verschuren, 2006, Figure 1) 
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The assumption is that the amount exceeding the current AOW aggregate level is drawn entirely 
from taxes, which are paid for also by those aged 65 and over proportionate to their income. That 
amounts to a difference of approximately 1.5 percentage points in the financial OADR. Of course 
the uncertainty about population forecasts discussed above continues to make itself fully felt here; 
however, the impact on the OADR has been shown to be limited as the forecast variation affects all 
ages. Added to this is the uncertainty about economic developments which by definition are omitted 
here in order to focus as much as possible on the first-order effects of population ageing itself5. 
 
Table 2  Extrapolation to 2038 of AOW funding* from the income of 20-64-year-olds 













1985 523  397  800  1,769  6,523  8.5 
1999 686  534  933  2,152  17,536  8.1 
2004 share  77.6%  44.9%         






      
2038 1,552  1,292  1,203  4,047  29,357  12.7 
*) Excluding AOW received abroad 
Sources: amounts according to CBS/IPO, 1985-1999 figures according to Kroniek ratios, 2038 total according to current CBS population 
forecast, average incomes and tax payments according to IPO. 
 
The calculations show that the present 8% relationship to the aggregate income of 20-64-year-olds 
will rise by over 4.5 percentage points to 12.7%. Although considerable, for various reasons this 
increase does not appear insurmountable. Firstly, as we shall see later, during the recent pension 
crisis the premium rate levied on gross average earnings rose by a larger percentage (7%) in the 
space of only a few years. The increase does not therefore appear unmanageable, especially as in this 
case the consequence of the drop in demand of recent years will not eventuate because the revenue 
leads directly to AOW payments, which are basically received and spent within the Netherlands, and 
not to (pension) savings which are largely invested abroad6. 
                                                  
5 Van Eekelen and Olieman (2003) discuss “bull” and “bear” scenarios in which the AOW can vary as a percentage of GDP from 6% to 8% at its highest 
point. 
6 CPB (2006, 10) notes that European countries with a pay-as-you-go system experienced less fall in demand in recent years than the Netherlands due to 
the increase in premium rates for the capital-funded pension system 
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Figure 6  Employment rate* for calendar years and cohorts retiring 1973-2038 

















*) According to international definition of labour force including jobs of less than 12 hours per week 
I thank Peter van der Meer for making available his 1973-1997 dataset based on the research of Huijgen et al. 
Source: Author’s calculation from Peter van der Meer’s Huijgen dataset 1973-1985, OECD LFS 1990-2000 and CBS/Statline 2005. 
 
Nor does the extra funding seem impossible financially for the young in the sense of a compensating 
additional employment participation of those younger than 65. A 4.5% increase in the required 
contributions means a 3.3 percentage-points higher employment level, given that current incomes 
are based on an employment rate of 73%. This increase would cover the additional costs while the 
20-64-year-old group would retain its existing net income. In order to keep the burden on income 
for the under-65-year-olds unchanged at 8.1% – and thus to grant the younger group a 
proportionate increase in real income – a 12 to 13% increase in participation would be required, to 
an employment rate of up to 82.5%. This is somewhat over 80%, the target rate of government 
policy. An increase in average hours worked of no more than 3% could make up for the gap. Figure 
6 illustrates the feasibility of such a level without the need for much policy effort. It follows from an 
extrapolation to the future of the changes in employment participation of 5-year cohorts of men and 
women as they have occurred since the early 1970s. Cohort and calendar-based participation of 
men is virtually identical, while for women most of the gap will disappear as cohort-participation will 
grow quickly when present high-participation cohorts age. 
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Nevertheless, we are justified in also looking at the cost side of AOW expenditure. It has been 
suggested that expenditure can be reduced by gradually pushing up the retirement age to 67, with 
the argument that life expectancy is on the increase. Of course, such raising of the retirement age 
only makes sense if it leads to two years more of work participation and less of income from social 
security. Van Eekelen and Olieman (2003) argue that pushing back the retirement age to 67 will lead 
to greater expenditure on disability. Van Ewijk et al. (2006, 126) seem to confirm this in practice. 
For the two additional years, they predict the same low employment participation rate as at 64 
years of age (10 to 11%); the non-work income of 65 and 66-year-olds will therefore continue to be 
essential.  
 
3.2  OCCUPATIONAL PENSIONS AND PRIVATE ANNUITIES  
An increasingly important share of older people’s income derives from occupational pensions and 
private annuities. In accordance with these pension and annuity schemes, prior to old age, pension 
contributions are deposited into capital funds using actuarial guidelines. The pension or annuity is 
paid from the profits from invested savings. These revenues comprise real incomes on the one hand, 
for example from interest on loans issued or rent, and (potential) appreciation on the other, for 
example from shares. During the same post-1957 period in which the AOW flourished, an 
impressive pension system was built up in this country (Figure 7). To a large extent the baby-boom 
generation simultaneously funded the previous generation’s old-age provision via the AOW and its 
own provision via occupational pension accrual. 
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Source: CBS/Statline, Statistics institutional investors 
 
At the end of 2005 the book value of the pension funds corresponded to 130% of GDP. The 
Netherlands ranks first in the world in this respect, together with Switzerland and Iceland. 
Provisions for old age in many European countries are largely funded by pay-as-you-go systems. This 
contrasts with the Anglo-Saxon countries where capital funding is the rule, but even there the 
savings accumulated in capital funds are only half the size of what is found for the topranking 
countries. Pay-as-you-go funding is not in itself a disadvantage; in a demographic steady state it can 
even be more economical because it is much simpler – and hence cheaper – to administer and it is 
not susceptible to fluctuating interest rates and share returns. The advantage of capital funding, 
however, is that it can also benefit from revenue from investments abroad, where the demographic 
situation may be more favourable. In addition to pay-as-you-go or capital funding, private savings 
(and debt) are also important, but they are more difficult to measure and compare internationally. 
Van Aggelen et al. (2006) state that countries like Italy have huge savings tied up in house ownership, 
partly for the purpose of old age, and they also take debt – such as the high mortgage debt in the 
Netherlands – into consideration, alongside pension savings. It should be noticed that the magnitude 
of the pension funds is a mixed blessing because any erosion quickly becomes of considerable 
magnitude in relation to the national economy. This was illustrated by the recent Dutch experience 
after the dotcom bubble burst when aggregate pension savings fell by 20% of GDP. Any adjustments 
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of pension funding and its rules should therefore be processed with utmost caution, more so than 
has happened with very strong enforced savings in the Netherlands in recent years as Beunders 
(2006) observes. 
Pension funding occurs through contribution deposits and returns on capital holdings, together 
making up almost 10% of GDP. As pointed out above, the return derives from realised investment 
income and (non-realised) appreciation. Between 1980 and the second half of the nineties, the role 
of returns grew and that of deposits decreased. That situation changed radically following the 
collapse of the stock market when the internet hype came to an end, which of course affected the 
non-realised value. Since then contribution payments have more than doubled over a short period, 
from 2.4% of GDP in 2000 to 5.6% in 2004. As a percentage of gross average earnings (including 
employer-paid benefits and taxes), they rose from 4% in 1997-1999 to 11% in 2004, an increase of 7 
percentage points. 
Pension capital provides for income in old age on the basis of cohorts and cohort savings. As we 
have seen cohort ageing is far less rapid, with the cohort that will be retiring in 2040 only 2 
percentage points up from the current 27%. All the same, this difference has to be compensated for. 
This can be done by working more in the event of unchanged pension contributions or, alternatively, 
through additional pension savings. Both are acceptable options and should be open for discussion. 
At the same time, we have established that although the share of occupational pensions in older 
people’s incomes may be on the increase, it should not be overestimated. There is simply no 
question of large numbers of people attaining 70% of their previous earnings, whether this be their 
final salary or average salary. Thus the financial outlook for the occupational-pension system 
presents few problems on demographic grounds; it does so only because of the negative impact of 
new regulations for managing and organising the system, particularly with regard to the actuarial 
valuation of property and obligations which are an important aspect of Ewijk (2006) and supervision 
by the acting pension-fund authority, the Dutch central bank.. 
 
Costs of pension provisions 
Market forces are an important policy principle, also for pensions – as implemented for example in 
the levensloopregeling (life-course savings scheme) that was introduced by the government in 2006 to 
replace early retirement plans. This scheme allows employees to save income for a period off and 
pension funds are prohibited from providing this service. This has been decided on the basis of 
ideological principles without taking costs and hence economic efficiency into account. Costs are 
very important for the net long-term returns on pension deposits in a capital funding system. In a 
pay-as-you-go system, their significance is comparatively small; there is after all no capital to be 
managed and individual entitlements are simple to administer. The UK’s Turner Commission 
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devotes an entire chapter to costs and partly for this reason argues for a national pension savings 
scheme. Their costing target is 0.3% of the built-up value. However, this dimension of costs and 
administrative structure is altogether absent from Dutch policy-making; it may reflect complacency 
as a result of the high pension savings in international comparison. 
 
Figure 8  Administration costs of occupational pension*, % of deposits, payments and 
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*) Administration costs and exploitation surplus 
Source: calculated from CBS/Statline, National Accounts 
 
Figure 8 shows the administration costs for the three types of pension provision and for two types 
of providers – funds and private insurance companies. The Turner Commission measures the costs 
as a percentage of the balance of pension funds – the 0.25% of the Dutch funds then compares 
favourably in international terms and is also mentioned by Turner. That measure is seen indicated to 
the right of the figure and is 16 times lower for pension funds than for the private insurance 
companies. A better measure, however, is to relate costs to the three types of administrative 
activity that pensions entail: acquiring and registering participants, administering pension payments 
and realising capital revenues. Costs on this basis are indicated on the left-hand side of the figure. 
The advantage is that this measure also allows a comparison with the pay-as-you-go system, which 
after all does not have a balance and no capital management costs. The AOW is by far the cheapest. 
The administration of both occupational pensions and annuities by private insurance companies is, 
however, exorbitantly expensive – 10 times more than for pension funds. Therefore it seems logical 
that the greater the demographic OADR value is, the smaller the role of private providers should 
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be. The argument of a level playing field between profit en not-for-profit providers is a dangerous 
one unless it has as its objective the benchmarking of private costs to the funds’ best practice. A 
cost reduction from 4% to 1% of the balance for the portion (33%) of the total balance of Dutch 
pension savings that is managed by private insurance companies, can in principle fully offset the 
negative effect on pension savings valuation of the assumption of a reduced actuarial interest rate 
from 4 to 3%, for the next 100 years, which is of central importance to Van Ewijk (2006). 
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4 INEQUALITIES IN AGEING: SEX AND EDUCATION 
To properly assess the ways in which population ageing is being addressed, as reflected for example 
in the standard, fully uniform retirement age (or the plan to gradually push this up) and the recent 
abolition of early retirement facilities before the age of 65, it is important to examine demographic 
differences among the population. A uniform approach can lead to unequal treatment, with on 
balance a transfer occurring from one group to the other, from the ones with a shorter life to those 
living longer. 
Almost by definition, demographic data on life expectancy distinguish according to sex. Figure 1 and 
Table 1 revealed important disparities between men and women which – since 1861, but above all 
from the 1960s onwards – have grown to a 4.7 years longer life expectancy for women today. The 
effects on the OADR value are considerable. Other than the future trailing growth in female life 
expectancy suggests, the female share will rise from 52% for the first birth cohort in Figure 2 to 61% 
for the cohort that retires by 2050. 
This reinforces an important potential problem that lurks in the political determination of viewing 
each man or woman as an independent individual. As far back as the Pension agreement of 
December 1997, the Labour Foundation (national employer and union confederations) and the 
government agreed on cutting back the survivor’s pension given to dependant relatives upon the 
decease of  a pensioner or an employee still actively building up pension entitlements. The major 
pension fund, ABP, interpreted this two years ago as a halving of the survivor’s pension as a 
percentage of the original pension. The argument is that women should be economically 
independent and should take care of their own pension contributions. However, it should be said 
that the income over which this is calculated for women is generally small as it is mostly based on 
part-time work. In 2004 40% of adult 7 female employees, as opposed to 6% of adult men, earned 
less per annum than the amount corresponding to the individual AOW. Pension savings can (and 
will) be built up on a part-time income, but even if the 70% mark would be attained, the 
accompanying pension incomes will amount to very little for households following the death of a 
partner on a full pension. Most people are unaware of the unmistakable threat of future poverty 
among surviving women. 
                                                  
7 Aged 25 and over 
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Table 3  Life expectancy* (years) at different ages by educational attainment**, 1995/99 
 Men    Women 





















expectancy, at:       
 
    
 
0  years  73.1 76.0 76.0 78.0 4.9  79.5 82.0 82.1 82.1 2.6 
20  years  73.6 76.5 76.5 78.5 4.9  79.9 82.4 82.5 82.5 2.6 
50  years  74.3 77.1 77.0 78.9 4.6  80.3 82.7 82.9 82.8 2.5 
65  years  76.1 78.4 78.3 79.8 3.7  81.4 83.5 83.6 83.5 2.1 
Healthy life 
expectancy, at:      
 
    
 
0  years  52.9 60.6 63.2 68.7 15.8 54.2 63.2 64.5 68.2 14.0 
20  years  55.5 62.7 65.1 70.5 15.0 56.4 65.1 66.5 70.0 13.6 
50  years  63.6 67.4 68.7 73.0 9.4  65.4 70.9 71.3 74.0 8.6 
65  years  71.3 72.9 73.4 76.3 5.0  72.4 75.7 76.2 77.4 5.0 
*) Calculated from CBS Cause of death statistics, GLOBE, LASA, MORGEN, ERGO, POLS, health and work 
**) Educational attainment: low: no education or only primary education; lower secondary: LBO (vocational 
education) and MAVO (general education), higher secondary: HAVO (general education), VWO (pre-
university education) and MBO (vocational education), high: HBO (professional education) and WO 
(university education). 
 Source: Van Herten et al. (2002), Tables 1 and 3–6; I wish to thank the authors for making available the data on 50-year-olds. 
 
A second aspect of inequality that tends to be overlooked in Dutch ageing policies is diverging life 
expectancies for different socio-economic groups, which again is a key feature of the British pension 
debate (Turner, 2005, 47)8. Unfortunately, few data are available on this, but the data we do have 
reveal marked disparities. TNO research (Van Herten et al., 2002) has operationalised socio-
economic status on the basis of on educational attainment. In theory, the use of occupational status 
and income is preferable but educational attainment is easier to identify; it is also more stable for an 
individual and hence easier to track over time than occupation or income. 
Table 3 outlines the differences for the Netherlands. At birth the life expectancy of men with little 
education is five years less than for highly educated men. The situation is similar for women, 
although the differences are somewhat smaller – possibly in part because women in the low-
educated category form a larger group more similar to better educated women relative to men. The 
differences change little with age, but most of all for those with little education after the age of 50. 
                                                  
8 Very recently this was discovered by Bovenberg (et al., 2006) of Tilburg University, who is central to the Dutch early-retirement and pension debate.  
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What is significant are the disparities in life expectancy in good health – that is, the years in which 
people perceive themselves as healthy. At birth, men with the lowest educational attainment cannot 
expect on average to live more than 53 years in good health, much less than the retirement age of 
65; the most highly educated men, at 69 years, have almost an additional 16 years. For women, the 
differences between high and low educational attainment are not much smaller in this respect. At 20 
years, the start of working life, the differences are not much smaller but they then drop sharply at 
50 and 65 years. Evidently, the effects materialise at a later age. It would appear that the less-well 
educated with a lower healthy life expectancy fall away at an earlier age than those who are highly 
educated. It implies that those with little education run a greater risk on balance of paying 
contributions to the AOW and occupational pensions over a long period without themselves being 
able to enjoy the benefits. 
Unfortunately, these are calendar-based data, as cohort data are unavailable. Nevertheless, the 
changes according to age can be a useful indicator. The low healthy-life expectancy of the less 
educated helps us understand the recent opposition of the trade unions to a uniform pension age, as 
expressed by the recent abolition of early retirement, and the proposals to push up the retirement 
age for AOW. Health arguments should not be omitted from this discussion. Turner also proposes 
raising the retirement age in the British pension system but only with provisions for such disparities. 
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5 CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
The purpose of this paper has been to identify the impact of first-order effects of population ageing 
on funding for retirement, leaving out other costs such as those of health care, which would 
plausibly also be incurred without population ageing. The finding is that, although not minor, the 
effects are not insurmountable. The dangers associated with an ageing population are being 
exaggerated in a debate which focuses exclusively on their implications for the government budget, 
as is done by the recent CPB study (Van Ewijk, 2006). As a result, other problems are also being 
completely overlooked, resulting in a lack of balance in the public debate and policy making. 
Demographic change was examined in two ways: on the basis of calendar years and of birth cohorts. 
There are huge differences between the forecasts related to population ageing that these two 
approaches produce. On a calendar basis, the old-age dependency ratio doubles to 44 percent at its 
highest point, in 2040. On a cohort basis, the ratio has been high for quite some time and will rise 
only slowly in the coming decades; the cohort that will retire at the age of 65 towards 2040 will be 
at 29% as against 27% now. It is cohort development that best reflects individual life expectancy, 
which has increased sharply at birth in the past 150 years but much less so at 65 years of age. It is 
conspicuous – and the first sign of imbalance in the debate – that the fact that the Netherlands is 
lagging behind other countries in terms of life expectancy, now and in the future, is not viewed with 
disquiet. It may be because this lagging trend helps explain why the dependency ratio in the 
Netherlands is expected to increase at a lesser rate than in most other countries.  
An equally conspicuous point of imbalance is that the Dutch political debate on population ageing 
pays paid no attention to the major socio-economic disparities in (healthy) life expectancy, which lie 
at the heart of the British pension debate. As a consequence, some groups are making contributions 
to the basic public pension AOW and occupational pension savings schemes for long years but 
derive little benefit themselves given the high standard pension age – 65 years, if not 67 in the 
future. A more equitable solution would be to allow people to retire after a certain number of 
working years instead of at a standard age. It is of course imperative that we combat the underlying 
health differences but as long as these exist, they need to be taken into account. It is also important 
to recognise that women in particular will make up a significantly increasing share of the dependency 
in the decades to come. However, the downward revision of the surviving dependant’s pension, 
with women’s economic independence as its rationale, threatens to place them in an untenable 
situation; even with complete pension accrual, their pension entitlement will be small because of the 
high frequency of part-time work and insufficient to replace the absence of a partner’s pension based 
on full-time income. Staving off this future poverty is deserving of greater attention and the low 
degree of cohort ageing allows scope for this. 
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The calendar/cohort distinction is critical when it comes to determining the financial implications of 
population ageing. The AOW puts pressure on the (younger) calendar population through a pay-as-
you-go system, while occupational pensions are financed by the participants themselves on a cohort 
basis through capital funding. Problems of the latter are not primarily demographic but rather 
politico-economic in nature. Cohort ageing is slight, and on the obligation side, the requirements 
regarding future pension outgoings based on demographically sound projections are apparent. On 
the revenue side, there were large negative returns on investments in 2000-2002 after the dotcom 
bubble burst, but that was fully offset within a few years as a result of market recovery and higher 
contributions (notably with falling demand in the domestic economy as a result). Now, however, the 
anticipated returns are coming under pressure from changing accounting rules and a pessimistic 
assessment of future interest-rate levels and share returns. The implications of this discussion are 
enormous, but talks are being held by only a small group in the absence of any real political debate. 
Benchmarking private providers to the best practice of  the  funds would fully offset the 
consequences of 3% actuarial interest instead of 4%. But the administration costs of occupational 
and private pensions is another major and highly relevant factor that is being overlooked in ageing 
policies. Neglected in the Netherlands, this issue is central to the British pension debate. Minor 
differences in costs have huge consequences because of their long-term effects on individual pension 
build-up over 30 or 40 years. In this country, the costs of private administration – responsible for 
one third of occupational pensions – are a factor 10 to 16 times higher than those related to the 
administration by collective pension funds. The levensloopregeling (life-course scheme), newly 
introduced after the abolition of early retirement, can only be administered privately and is 
threatening to lead the way in runaway administration costs if people take full advantage of the 
continuous opportunities it offers to change the amounts and purpose of their investments and the 
choice of bank. Free choice is no free lunch, and these implications are not being given the necessary 
attention. 
By contrast, the calendar population funds the AOW in the form of a pay-as-you-go system, which 
means that the costs will increase significantly as the population ages. The usual discussion, in terms 
of GDP, hampers a proper assessment of the income effects. Using age-based income data from the 
CBS Income panel survey IPO, we find that the role of the AOW is greater for the income of older 
people while that of occupational pensions is smaller (but still growing). A simple exercise applying 
the figures for the year 2038 to the current situation (thus with unchanged distribution of any 
economic growth) shows that the 20-64-year-old group will have to contribute 12.7% instead of 
8.1% of its income in order to maintain the current AOW level. That is in itself a surmountable 
burden – no greater than the recent occupational pension contribution increases of 7% in a few 
years’ time. The 20-64 age group can compensate by a small 3.5% increase in work participation and 
maintain the same real income.  
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This seems a feasible increase that can be realised without much policy effort. Employment levels for 
20-64-year-olds have risen sharply in the past 30 years, from 59 to 73%. On the basis of cohort 
behaviour, throughout the recent recession, we can expect it to continue climbing to 79% in around 
2040. Women were entirely responsible for the past increase and will be largely responsible for this 
future growth. 
Letting go of government funding as the basic principle in the ageing debate can have an illuminating 
effect and can restore the balance. 
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